Rule of Law, Legal Development and Economic Growth: Perspectives for Pakistan by Hasan, Lubna
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Rule of Law, Legal Development and
Economic Growth: Perspectives for
Pakistan
Lubna Hasan
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
30. September 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25565/
MPRA Paper No. 25565, posted 1. October 2010 19:35 UTC
  1
Rule of Law, Legal Development and Economic Growth: 
 Perspectives for Pakistan 
 
 
By 
Lubna Hasan 
Senior Research Economist 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics 
September 2010 
 
JEL Classification: K10, O43 
Key Words: Rule of Law, Legal Development, Economic Growth 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Rule of Law and strong legal systems are considered a pre-condition for sustained 
development. Their relative weakness in the under-developed world is considered as the 
main obstacle to growth. Strengthening Rule of Law and legal systems has, therefore, 
become a standard advice from the developing community. Pakistan, too, has witnessed a 
surge in demand for Rule of Law in recent years. Capitalizing on this domestically 
garnered mandate, this paper reviews the legal obstacles to economic growth in Pakistan. 
It finds significant impediments for growth and market development due to legal 
shortcomings in the case of Pakistan. 
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“…the reformer has enemies in all these who profit by the 
old order and only lukewarm defenders in all those who 
would profit by the new”. 
Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. VI 
 
Recent times have witnessed an increased demand for Rule of Law in Pakistan. The 
movement for restoration of judiciary, which basically emerged and was sustained by the 
urban centers of Pakistan and later evolved into a broader consensus for strengthening 
Rule of Law, has been considered ‘elitist’ by its critics. Their arguments connote Rule of 
Law as a luxury that is demanded by the urban elites only, while the poor in both urban 
and rural areas are concerned more about their livelihoods. This debate rages on in 
Pakistan at a time when the development community is unanimous in its prescription 
about Rule of Law as a solution to the ills of under-development1. This paper argues that 
Rule of Law and a strong legal system are necessary conditions for economically 
progressing and socially ‘just’ societies – both essential for improving the living 
conditions of masses in Pakistan. 
 
Since, economic growth and improvement in the welfare of its citizen is a prime concern 
for the Government of Pakistan, and realizing that “economic development does not take 
place in a vacuum”, the Government vows to develop an “orderly framework for carrying 
out its economic reforms”. It has undertaken an extensive reform of the laws relating to 
the banking and financial sector, commerce and industry, energy, information 
technology, social as well as administrative and judicial system2. The area, however, begs 
scholarly attention. The paper tries to fill this gap.  
 
 
Rule of Law 
                                                 
1 Major international development and donor agencies place ‘Legal Reforms’ ‘Law and Development’ and 
‘Rule of Law’ on their to-do list for developing countries. The World Bank has ‘Law and Development’ as 
a topic of development.  Also see ADB (2004), APEC (2007).  Carothers (1998) writes, “one cannot get 
through a foreign policy debate these days without someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the 
world’s troubles”. 
2 See Hassan (2000) for details. 
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[W]henever there is 
discretion there is room 
for arbitrariness… 
discretionary authority 
on the part of the 
government means 
insecurity for legal 
freedom on the part of 
its subject. (Dicey, 
(1914).  
“Rule of law as a concept seeks to ensure that government power is limited and 
that individual rights are protected. The essence of the rule of law is the 
sovereignty or supremacy of law over people and governments. The rule insists 
that every person, regardless of position or status in society, will be subject to the 
law and will be dealt with equally. The rule of law is more than your regulation 
by law but a guarantee of freedoms, human rights and equal treatment before the 
law” [Watson (2003): 4].  
 
“All the organs of state – the executive, legislature and judiciary – have a shared 
responsibility for upholding the rule of law…the rule of law will only have real 
meaning in practical terms in a society in which all organs of the state are 
mindful of their obligations to respect it.” [Goldsmith (2006): 11] 
 
While consensus exists on the importance of Rule of Law for economic development, it 
is less clear what is actually meant by the term. Analysts distinguish between the formal 
and the substantive definition of Rule of Law. While formal (also known as narrow or 
thin) definition is less binding on the content of the law, basically requiring that there be 
a publically declared law, prospective in nature fulfilling conditions of generality, 
certainty and equality, the substantive (broad or thick) definition requires recognition of 
individuals rights and liberties [Tamanaha (2007)]. Most research find it suffice to focus 
on the thin definition that there be law which is binding on all.  
The success of the west is attributed to the emergence of constitutional governments and 
Rule of Law. For England, the Glorious Revolution (1688), 
which is considered as the landmark event that established the 
supremacy of parliament over monarchy, paved the way for 
industrial revolution through secured property rights (and 
contract enforcement), essentially by putting a check on the 
discretionary powers and predatory behavior of the monarchs 
[Dam 2006]. Below we discuss this link between Rule of Law 
and growth. 
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1. Rule of Law, Legal Development and Economic Growth 
 
“Modern economy needs effective laws to promote cooperation among people” 
[Cooter (1996): 5] 
 
“When the rule of law is undermined, both the economy and the whole system 
grows sick.” [Ruli (1999): 46] 
 
Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations writes “Commerce and manufactures can seldom 
flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in 
which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in 
which the faith of contract is not supported by law…” [Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 
(V, iii)]. 
 
Though economic growth may not be the goal 
of law3, but there is no denying the fact that 
growth is conditioned by the legal structure. 
While conventional neo-classical growth models 
assumed an “institution free” economy, it has 
become very clear now that growth occurs in the 
context of given institutional environment4. 
Specifically, recent research in this area 
highlights the importance of well-specified and 
enforced property-rights and contracts for economic growth, without which people will 
not be “lured” into economically productive activities [North (1990)]5.  But specification 
and enforcement of property rights and contracts requires an efficient and impartial legal 
                                                 
3 This point is hotly debated in the legal fraternity, where the opinion is divided over considering economic 
growth as a concern for legal system and posits that the basic purpose of any law is to provide justice and 
protect the fundamental rights of individuals [see Cross (2002)]. 
4 See Hasan (2007) for a review of evidence in this regard. 
5 “economic growth will occur if property rights make it worthwhile to undertake socially productive 
activity” [North and Thomas (1973: 8)] 
There is a necessary and inevitable linkage 
between human rights, the rule of law and 
economic prosperity. In all countries where 
men and women of talent are free to 
exercise their skills in the knowledge that 
wrongs against them or their property will 
be prevented and punished by free courts, 
business needs may be promoted, protected 
and rewarded by a democratic or elected 
governments then prosperity will flourish. 
Where there is lawlessness and corruption 
the converse is the case. [Watson 2003] 
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system. Quick and fair dispensation of justice is necessary for investors to feel secure in 
possession of their properties and investments.  
 
There is overwhelming evidence from around the world that legal rules affect economic 
growth6. Research has particularly sought to understand the impact of property rights 
(and contract enforceability), of government regulation, and judicial independence on 
market development and economic performance. Differences in legal systems cause 
different political and economic outcomes [Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)]. Evidence 
suggests countries with legal systems derived from Roman civil law have more 
interventionist governments than those that have roots in the more flexible “judge-made” 
common law system. Consequently they offer less secure property rights, worse 
regulation; and inefficiencies in terms of bureaucratic delays and little tax compliance [La 
Porta, et al (1999)]. Further, civil law countries are subject to judicial delays, corruption, 
and unfair judicial decisions [Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003)]. 
Number of studies have also found a positive relationship between freedom and growth 
[Ali and Crain (2002), Alan and Chase (2005), Berggren (2003), Cole (2003), Farr, Lord, 
and Wolfenbarger (1998), Grubel (1998), Gwartney and Lawson (2006), Norton (1998), 
Prokopijevic (2002), Stocker (2005), Tures (2003), Vega-Gordill and lvarez-Arce (2003). 
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6 In a series of papers, Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003), Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002, 2003) and La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998, and 1999) have stressed 
the importance of legal system for growth. 
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The graph (Graph 1) depicts that countries where Rule of Law prevails have higher 
income7. Much evidence supports the proposition that ‘Secure property rights’ and ‘Rule 
of Law’ induce economic growth [Acemogle, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002, 
2003, 2005a, 2005b), Rodrik, et al. (2004), Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) Easterly and 
Levine (2003) and Kaufmann and Kraay (2002).  
 
Development of markets is essentially a legal challenge. Markets do not exist in a 
vacuum. They are supported by a complex web of institutional infrastructure [Grief 
(2005)]. Any exchange in the market requires a complex legal structure ensuring that the 
property rights of buyers and sellers are recognised and enforced.  
 
Exchange within the market domain requires property rights and contracts. Though 
formal legal institutions are not essential for an exchange to take place – economic 
activity/exchange occurred in primitive societies in the absence of such institutions, but 
as one moves away from a simple exchange problem where goods are exchanged 
simultaneously to a situation involving impersonal exchange problems arise. Impersonal 
exchange, characterised by the separation of quid and quo, is fraught with numerous 
contractual problems.  The separation of the quid and the quo creates possibilities of 
opportunism when one party, instead of honoring the deal, finds it to his advantage ex post 
to reopen the bargaining [Dam (2006)]. Some mechanisms of contract enforcement are 
required. Clear and predictable rules, transparency in procedures and third-party 
enforcement of the complex impersonal contractual relations are necessary for expansion 
of markets. Good law and good institutions augment markets [Summers (1999)]. 
 
Any society is besieged with disputes over ownership of assets, performance of contract, 
debt obligations. Since conflicts and disputes are part and parcel of any exchange 
economy8,  “only where disputes are settled according to well understood and regulated 
principles of law and settled free of corrupt or totalitarian influence will investment flow 
                                                 
7 The data on income refers to PPP adjusted per capita GDP for 2005 taken from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. ‘Rule of Law’ is taken from World Bank Governance Indicators., and is for the 
year 2005. 
8 See Greif (1989, 1993, and 2003) and Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) for problems related to 
impersonal exchange and role of institutions in solving them. 
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and individual and corporate prosperity follows." [Watson (2003): 4]. Rule of Law 
provides guarantee that these disputes would be settled efficiently and fairly. Essentially, 
establishment of larger markets and prospects of long-term contracts are difficult if legal 
rules are not clearly defined and consistently applied [Buscaglia (2000)]. 
 
Capital markets play a pivotal role in the economic development of societies as they 
serve as a conduit between investors and those who save9. World over, equity marketing 
has become a major source of external finance for the corporate sector. It allows 
corporations to acquire capital much larger than what debt contract could possibly offer, 
at the same time, spreads risk over larger number of shareholders. The law has to provide 
instruments for risk sharing, especially for small shareholders vis-à-vis large 
shareholders. Research supports the hypothesis that countries which provide better legal 
protection to investors develop efficient capital markets [La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-
Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1998)].  Further, the extent of legal cover for the 
investors is another area of concern. Protection of property against expropriation is one 
important yardstick against which foreign investors assess the risk of investment.  
 
Rule of Law encourages entrepreneurship and business development [Stolper et aI 
(2006)]. Corporate sector development hinges upon the security and ease of transition 
from informal set-up to formalization provided by the law. Can an enterprise be free in a 
country governed by no “rule of law”? Research shows that countries governed by ‘rule 
of law’ (limited government and democracy) pose few barriers of entry into the formal 
system, whereas countries with heavy regulation have higher corruption and larger 
unofficial economies [Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer 
(2002)]. The move from extralegal status to a registered business poses extraordinary 
hurdles for the entrepreneur in developing countries, and majority of small enterprises 
work in the informal sector10.  
 
                                                 
9 It is useful to distinguish between alternative sources of external finance; debt and equity. Debt contract is 
typically a “hard” contract (non-payment of interest or principal amount can lead to legal recourse possibly 
ending in bankruptcy). In contrast, equity contract is a “soft” contract. Equity financing has an additional 
benefit of spreading risk over a number of shareholders. 
10 For example, 82% of all entrepreneurs in Egypt (1.4million) work in the informal sector (Galal 2004).  
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Rule of Law and Judicial Systems An independent, impartial and efficient judiciary is 
imperative for rule of law and a peaceful, ordered society. In its ideal form the (legal) 
“machinery consists of competent, ethical, and well-paid judges who administer rules that 
are well designed for the promotion of commercial activity. The judges are insulated 
from interference by the legislative and executive branches of the government. They are 
advised by competent, ethical and well-paid lawyers. The judges are numerous enough to 
decide cases without interminable delay, and they operate against a background of rules 
and practices...that enables them to resolve factual issues relating to legal disputes with 
reasonable accuracy and at reasonable cost to the disputants [Posner (1998)]. The judicial 
system must ensure that judges are independent of the executive control and influence of 
the powerful elites, and are not susceptible to coercion (threats and violence) by the 
litigants. Feld and Voigt (2003) have found a positive association between de facto 
judicial independence and economic growth. 
 
5. The Pakistani Context 
 
With this discussion in mind, we turn to the case in point – the inter-linkages between 
legal development, or lack of it, and growth in Pakistan? But, first, let us see how 
Pakistan fares on account of Rule of Law. 
 
The Rule of Law Tradition: The last many years have seen an enormous interest in the 
‘institutional environment’ for investment and growth. Resultantly, the data on the 
institutional environment of countries is regularly presented by many international and 
private organizations (The World Bank, The PRS Group, and Transparency International 
etc).  Historically, Pakistan has not figured well in ‘the Rule of Law’ indicator of the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators Datasets (Fig. 1). This indicator ‘measures the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society’ (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999).  Even within South Asia, it does not fare well vis-à-vis 
its competitors (Fig. 2), except for Afghanistan which has been experiencing a war since 
2001.  
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What explains this dismal performance? The essence of Rule of Law is supremacy of law 
over people [Watson (2003)]. The concept serves as a check on the discretionary power 
of those in position of authority, and as guarantee of freedom for the citizens [Dicey 
(1914)]. For an ordinary Pakistani citizen, Rule of Law remains an elusive dream [Hassan 
(2007)]. The important question to ask is whether the constitution of Pakistan provides 
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for and our legal system protects the fundamental rights of its citizens against abuses by 
powerful elites? Is the executive too powerful or there are enough checks and balances 
within the system? These political economy issues mar any discussion on legal systems 
in Pakistan. There is not just disenchantment with the prevailing economic system and 
with narrow concept of growth but also concerns about society being besieged by 
dominating elite [Easterly (2001), Gardezi and Rashid (1983)]. Do these power structures 
abuse legal system and undermine implementation of fundamental rights granted under 
the constitution? Easterly (2001) links Pakistan’s poor performance in institutional 
development to both elite domination and ethnic diversity. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) 
found similar reasons for Latin America’s lop-sided development11.  Hassan (2007) holds 
repeated military interventions, and the dominant position of the military in the 
Pakistan’s power base as a serious threat to Rule of Law in Pakistan. 
 
The Constitution of Pakistan envisions a governance system based on principles of social 
justice and protection of fundamental rights with separation of powers between the 
Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary [Hassan (2007)]. However, frequent suspension 
of the constitution, and transgressing into the domain of others by separate branches of 
the government has rendered the establishment of Rule of Law a difficult, if not 
impossible, undertaking in Pakistan. Not placing the entire burden of this state of affairs 
on the frequent military interventions alone, a recent report on the Rule of Law 
assessment for Pakistan concludes that in the entire post-independence period, both 
civilian and military government have tried to ‘rule by law’ rather than the ‘rule of law’ 
[Blue, Hoffman and Berg (2008)]. We now turn to how imperfections in the legal system 
hamper growth prospects for the Pakistan’s economy. 
 
Legal System and Economic Growth in Pakistan 
                                                 
11 They argue that the elite influence and state capture accounts for Latin America’s poor institutional 
development despite economic growth. 
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The total value of the 
real estate held but 
not legally owned by 
the poor of the Third 
World and former 
communist nations is 
at least $9.3 trillion  
(De Soto, The 
Mystery of Capital) 
Economies grow as markets expand, and development of 
markets hinges on a well developed legal system, which 
ensures that property rights are recognized and contracts are 
enforced. However, cost of enforcing contract and securing 
property rights are still high in most developing countries, 
hampering investments and savings as well as markets 
[Buscaglia (2000)]. Likewise, markets are not well developed in Pakistan. With regards 
to credit market, the major issue in asset based lending is collateral requirement. A large 
chunk of the capital is in the form of land which can be reliable collateral. Problems arise 
since land records are complex, inaccurate, and unclear, and allow significant room for 
manipulation [Kardar (2007), Khan (2006), Qazi (2006)]; hence pose a constraint on 
asset based lending.12 ‘Cumbersome regulations and inaccurate, complex and opaque 
records result in most land remaining either unregistered or held with informal titles, 
contributing to fraudulent transactions and costly civil litigation [Government of Pakistan 
(2005): 5]. Unclear property rights also pose problems for title insurance. It amounts to 
dead capital to the tune of 45% of property values (guesstimate). How these inefficiencies 
in land market combined with weaknesses in the judicial system hampers growth is 
evident from the following. “In commercial and land disputes, the uncertainty created by 
the legal posture is highly damaging to investment prospects and ordinary commercial 
dealings. It is reported that contracts are dishonored until enforced in court. Land disputes 
must go to court for resolution because of the absence of any land recording and 
registration system – this makes it necessary for every party to prove their right to land ab 
initio every time any question arises. Estimates of the huge impact of land cases ranged 
from 60 – 80 percent of court caseloads. These cases clog the courts because they are not 
easy to resolve speedily. While the courts proceed more expeditiously in resolving 
criminal and family cases, the presence of the land cases, which cannot be resolved 
elsewhere, occupy the great portion of the civil docket. Leading lawyers to seek 
alternative means such as arbitration to resolve commercial and large civil matters’ [Blue, 
Hoffman and Berg (2008); 16]. 
 
                                                 
12 See Khan (2006) for a discussion about complexity of land titling in Pakistan. 
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Equity markets in Pakistan are shallow and prone to market manipulations. Listed 
companies still constitute a small proportion of all registered companies in Pakistan13. 
What holds them back? What impedes risk sharing? What legal protection is there for 
minority shareholders against private benefits of control by dominant shareholder? How 
does the system bar against self-dealing and/or entrenchment? Cheema (2003) writes that 
the current ownership and control structure of family-based companies is not conducive 
for capital market development. Most of the big businesses are family owned with 
controlling shareholders and tight control over board of directors14. Further, concentration 
of control is greater than concentration of ownership. This concentration of control gives 
the controller ample opportunity to seek private benefits by tunneling external investors’ 
money into associated companies and diverting profits to personal expenditures 
[expensive housing, cars, offices, travel etc.], resulting in the loss of dividends to the 
external investors. The excessive private benefit seeking may explain why the incidence 
of pyramid structure is higher in Pakistan [Pakistan (textile 66.7%, non-textile 78.3%), 
Korea 42.6%, Thailand 12.7%]. The pyramid structures cross share-holdings and 
interlocking directorships are used to make cash transfers [through loans, selling assets at 
above or below the market rates] among other associated companies. Cheema, Bari and 
Siddiqui (2003) report a number of cases where SECP audit reports found such cash 
transfers being made. The family controllers seldom trade share in the market [0.9% 
annual as compared to 9.3% for the MNCs]. This structure of family-based corporations 
makes them wary of any reform, due to dilution of control over companies and disclosure 
requirements, and the result is illiquid and inefficient markets in Pakistan. Protection of 
minority shareholders is an important principle of the corporate governance code. 
General provisions for minority share holders include: Right to attend and call Annual 
General Meetings and Special General Meetings; voting rights (one share-one vote, proxy 
voting); right to claim dividend; judicial recourse in case of grievance; and rights related 
to divesture and transfer of shares. Weak corporate accountability of controllers, 
however, is not because of inadequate legal rules but due to the weak enforceability of 
these rules [ibid]. The World Bank in its assessment of the corporate governance in 
                                                 
13 Of the 51080 registered companies only about 800 are listed on the stock exchange. 
14 Percentage of family members on the board of directors is as high as 53% for the non-textile sector, and 
32% for the textile sector. 
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Pakistan also concludes that the extensive use of pyramiding by family businesses, inter-
locking directorships combined with high thresholds to initiate corporate actions 
undermines effective protection of minority shareholders [World Bank (2005)]. 
 
Good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic development by 
enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their access to outside capital. It 
reduces transaction cost, cost of capital and vulnerability to financial crises, and thus 
leads to capital market development. Pakistan promulgated the Code of Corporate 
Governance in 2002 to promote efficiency and deepening of capital markets, and 
enhancing performance of companies. Evidence suggests that firm performance improves 
with adherence to this code (Nishat and Shaheen (undated), Javid and Iqbal 2007). 
Typical features of corporate governance having a positive impact on firm performance 
are independent outside directors on and frequent meeting of audit committees; size of 
board of directors and the compulsory attendance; stock ownership for directors; and 
regular performance review of the board (Nishat and Shaheen (undated)). Javid and Iqbal 
(2007) also find board composition, ownership and shareholding as important predictors 
of firm performance. 
 
Equity markets have also faced market manipulations. Using data on trading history for 
KSE from December 1998 to August 2001, Khwaja and Mian (2005) found significant 
evidence of market manipulation by collusive stock brokers. Typically they found that 
when brokers acted on their own behalf (rather than working for outside investors) the 
annual returns were 50 to 90 percentage points higher. Further, these manipulative 
activities constitute a significant part of total market activities, amounting to 44% of total 
broker’s earnings. Market manipulations serve as deterrence for external investors, 
inhibiting deepening of financial markets in Pakistan. 
 
Formalization is another challenge. Corporatization of businesses - with benefits of 
limited liability, greater access to external capital, enhanced efficiency and productivity - 
has helped spur economic growth around the world. Yet, Pakistan has a high incidence of 
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enterprises working in the informal sector15. What bars these enterprises from moving 
into the formal set-up? The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has 
introduced many initiatives to reduce the entry barriers for firm. The SECP in association 
with the e-Government Directorate introduced an online company registration system, 
whereby an entrepreneur can register his company electronically. The online registration 
is also half as costly [World Bank (2010b)]. Many other reforms (improvement of 
Company Registration Office, introduction of Single Member Companies) have also been 
introduced to make corporatization attractive for firms. Despite these improvements, why 
do firms not enter into the formal set-up? Siddique (undated) in a review of legal and 
regulatory framework for corporatization of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
concludes that in spite of these developments on the ‘process’ side, ‘substantive’ barriers 
remain. He argues that the requirements of personal guarantees from the directors of the 
companies seeking loans, and even more stringent requirements for SMEs (Prudential 
Regulation for SMEs); Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance 2001; and 
National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999 have diluted the effectiveness and 
attractiveness of ‘limited liability’ clause for firms in Pakistan. Moreover, the tax regime 
does not offer any benefit of corporatization as companies face higher rate and multiple 
tiers of taxation [ibid]. In Pakistan complying with tax regulations require 560 hours per 
year. Enforcing a commercial contract requires 976 days. This is in contrast with the 
OECD average of 194 hours and 462 day respectively [The World Bank (2010a)]. High 
cost of doing business and cumbersome government regulations forces enterprises to 
remain in the informal sector. 
 
The judicial system in Pakistan faces problems of efficiency, transparency, 
accountability, independence and lack of human, financial and technical resources. 
Massive backlog, long delays and expensive litigation has diminished public trust in the 
justice system [Chaudhry (2007)]. Meddling of the executive in the affairs of the 
judiciary, lack of clarity and transparency in the appointment of judges, judges’ tenure, 
                                                 
15 Though statistics regarding size and structure of informal enterprises are rare in Pakistan, size of the 
informal sector is reported to be considerable in Pakistan. ILO (2002) reports approximately 428,000 
household and small manufacturing units work in the informal set-up, of these about 15000 enterprises 
employing more than 10 people. Almost 68% of total workforce in the non-agriculture sector is employed 
in the informal sector. 
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insufficient resources and case delays are important hurdles in the way of an efficient and 
impartial judicial system [Blue, Hoffman and Berg (2008)]. There are a number of laws 
(inheritance laws, rent laws, tenancy laws, preemption, oral gifts) that produce litigation. 
Courts are choked because of these litigations [ibid]. Long delays in the judicial process 
are yet another problem.  Loopholes in the system promote litigation and cause delays. 
There are no meaningful cost sanctions (culture of not appearing before courts). As a 
result huge assets are stuck in the legal systems, with serious implications for market 
transactions [Hasan (2006)]. Procedural reforms like daily reporting of cases and 
automation can have a positive impact on court efficiency and have been an integral part 
of the Access to Justice Program of the Asian Development Bank [Armytage (2003)]. 
The quality of legal education has also degraded overtime due to the mushroom growth 
of law colleges, which often disregard the rules that have been set by the Pakistan Bar 
Council [Government of Pakistan (2006)]. These declining standards of legal profession 
are a major factor in the weak judicial system in Pakistan. There is a perception that 
recourse to the legal system appears as an unfavorable and unattractive option for the 
underprivileged. The National Judicial Policy 2009 aims to tackle issues of backlog and 
delays, as well as the menace of corruption.  It is still early to judge the impact of the 
policy in resolving perennial issues confronting the justice system in Pakistan 
[Government of Pakistan (2009)]. 
 
6. Taking Stock, Looking Ahead 
 
There is overwhelming evidence from around the world that economic growth is 
conditioned by the legal setting. Markets thrive in an environment where property and 
contractual rights are protected and enforced, and disputes are resolved efficiently by the 
judicial system.  An independent, impartial and efficient judiciary, which protect the 
fundamental rights of the citizens, and to limit the discretionary powers of the state, is 
imperative for Rule of Law and a peaceful, ordered society. 
 
In Pakistan, legal system poses substantial impediments for the growth process as well 
for the development of markets. Our land, equity, and credit markets face several 
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inefficiencies on account of weak laws and legal infrastructure. Removing these obstacles 
can unleash the growth potential of the economy. Reforming our judicial system is even 
more important for guaranteeing fundamental rights of the ordinary Pakistani citizen. 
‘Law and Economics’ is still an underdeveloped and little researched discipline in 
Pakistan. Scattered research exists that looks at various dimensions of legal development 
and growth, but there is a need to bring it under the umbrella of a larger research 
initiative on ‘Law and Economics’. This paper has sought to pioneer this effort.  It was 
not the purpose of this paper to do an exhaustive research, but to set a research agenda for 
understanding the linkages between legal system and economic growth in Pakistan. 
Policy input from carefully investigated issues in future would be a welcome respite. 
 
References 
 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2001) The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review 91: 
December, 1369–1401. 
 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2002) Reversal of Fortune: Geography 
and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 117: November, 1231–1294. 
 
Acemoglu, D. (2003) The Root Cause. Finance and Development. June, 27–30. 
 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2005a) Institutions as the Fundamental 
Cause of Long-Run Growth. In P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds.) Handbook of Economic 
Growth. North Holland. 
 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2005b) The Rise of Europe: Atlantic 
Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth. American Economic Review 95: June, 
546–579. 
 
  17
Ali, M. A and W.M Crain (2002) Institutional Distortions, Economic Freedom, and 
Growth. Cato Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3: Winter, 415-426. 
 
Ali, M. A. and H. S. Isse (2003) Determinants of Economic Corruption: A Cross-country 
Comparison.  Cato Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3: Winter, 449-466. 
 
Alon, I. and G. Chase (2005) Religious Freedom and Economic Prosperity. Cato Journal, 
Vol. 25, No. 2: Spring/Summer, 399-406. 
 
Armytage, L. (2003) Pakistan’s Law and Justice Sector Reform Experience – Some 
Lessons. Paper presented at the 13th Commonwealth Law Conference (14 April 2003). 
Melbourne. 
 
Asian Development Bank (2004) Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development 
Bank. Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines. 
 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (2007) APEC Economic Policy Report. APEC 
Secretariat, Singapore 
 
Berggren,N. (2003) The Benefits of Economic Freedom A Survey The Independent 
Review, VIII (2): Fall,  pp. 193– 211. 
 
Blue, R., R. Hoffman and L. A. Berg (2008) Pakistan Rule of Law Assessment – Final 
Report. Prepared for the USAID/Pakistan by Management System International. 
Washington D C. 
 
Buscaglia, E. (2000) Law and Economics of Development in Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics. Edward Elgar and University of Ghent. Downloaded from: 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0580book.pdf. 
 
  18
Carothers, T. (1998) The Rule of Law Revival. Foreign Affairs, 77 (2): March/April, 95-
106. 
 
Chaudhry, I. M. (2007) Keynote Address of Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, 
Honorable Chief Justice of Pakistan. Islamabad. Downloaded from: 
http://www.ljcp.gov.pk/njc/ 
 
Cheema, A. (2003) Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Issues and Concerns. The NIPA 
Journal, 8(2): June, 7-19. 
 
Cheema, A., F. Bari, and O. Siddique (2003). Corporate Governance in Pakistan: 
Ownership, Control and the Law in F. Sobhan and EW. Werner (eds.) A Comparative 
Analysis of Corporate Governance in South Asia. Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, 
Dhaka. 
 
Cole, J.  H. (2003) The Contribution of Economic Freedom to World Economic Growth, 
1980–99. Cato Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2: Fall, 189-198. 
 
 
 
Cooter, R. D. (1996) The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State: Economic 
Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development. The Selected Works of Robert 
Cooter. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/robert_cooter/60 
 
Cross, F.B. (2002). Law and Economic Growth. Texas Law Review, 80 (7): June, 1737-
1775. 
 
Dam, K. (2006) Institutions, History and Economic Development. Chicago John M Olin 
Law and Economics. The Law School, University of Chicago. (Working Paper No. 271.) 
 
  19
Dicey, A. V. (1914) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Oxford. 
Available at: http://www.constitution.org/cmt/avd/law_con.htm 
 
Djankov, S., E. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2003) The 
New Comparative Economics. Journal of Comparative Economics. (forthcoming.) 
 
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2002) The Regulation of 
Entry.  Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1–37. 
 
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2003) Courts.  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 118: May, 453–517. 
 
Easterly, W. 2003. “The Political Economy of Growth without Development: A Case 
Study of Pakistan.” In D. Rodrik, ed., In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives of 
Growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Easterly, W., and R. Levine (2003) Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments 
Influence Economic Development. Journal of Monetary Economics 50: January, 3–39. 
 
Farr, W. K., R. A. Lord, and J. L. Wolfenbarger (1998) Economic Freedom, Political 
Freedom, and Economic Well-Being: A Causality Analysis. Cato Journal, Vol. 18, No. 
2: Fall, 247-262. 
 
Feld, L. P. and S. Voigt (2003) Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross 
Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators. CESifo Working Paper No. 906. 
CESifo. Munich. 
 
Galal (2004) The Economics of Formalization; Potential Winners and Losers from 
Formalization in Egypt. Working Paper number 95, Egyptian Centre for Economic 
Studies 
 
  20
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) Legal Origins. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
November, 1193–1229. 
 
Goldsmith, Q. C. (2006) Government and the Rule of Law in the Modern Age. LSE Law 
Department and Clifford Chance Lecture Series on Rule of Law. Available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/events/2006/20051214t1
509z001.htm 
 
Government of Pakistan (2009) National Judicial Policy 2009 [Revised Edition]. 
National Judicial (Policy Making) Committee. Secretarial, Law and Justice Commission 
of Pakistan. Islamabad. 
 
Government of Pakistan (2006) Report on the Policy Dialogue on the Strengthening the 
Legal Education System. Access to Justice Program. Ministry of Law, Justice and Human 
Rights. Islamabad. 
 
Government of Pakistan (2005) Towards a Prosperous Pakistan: A Strategy for Rapid 
Industrial Growth. Ministry of Industries, Production, and Special Initiatives. Islamabad. 
 
Greif, A. (1989) Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi 
Traders. The Journal of Economic History 49: December, 857–882. 
 
Greif, A. (1993) Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The 
Maghribi Trader’s Coalition. American Economic Review 83, 525–548. 
 
Greif, A., P. Milgrom, and B. R. Weingast (1994) Coordination, Commitment and 
Enforcement: the Case of Merchant Guild. Journal of Political Economy 102: August, 
745–776. 
 
  21
Greif, A. (2003) Institutions and Impersonal Change: The European Experience. 
http://www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/greif_228_2005/Greif%202005% 
20Impersonal %20Exchange.pdf. 
 
Greif, A. (2005) Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of 
Institutions Supporting Exchange. Downloaded from: http://www-
econ.stanford.edu/faculty/Greif_Papers/Commitment_Coercion_ Markets.html 
 
Grubel, H. G. (1998) Economic Freedom and Human Welfare: Some Empirical Findings. 
Cato Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2: Fall, 287-304. 
 
Gwartney, J. and R. Lawson (2006) The Path To Development: When Does The Legal 
Environment Become Critical? Cato Institute Economic Development Bulletin, No. 7: 
April 10, 1-2. 
 
Hasan (2007) Myths and Realities of Long-run Development: A Look at Deeper 
Determinants. The Pakistan Development Review, 46 (1): 19-44. 
 
Hasan (2006) Conference Report on Law and Economics. The Pakistan Development 
Review, 45 (1): Spring, 163-167. 
 
Hassan, P. (2007) Environmental Protection, Rule of Law and Judicial Crisis in Pakistan. 
Paper presented at the International Congress on Environmental Law (22-24 May, 2007), 
Rio de Janeiro. 
 
Hassan, T. (2000) Legal Framework for Economic Development in Pakistan. Pakistan 
and Gulf Economist. (No. 50) 31 (11 December 2000). 
 
International Labour Office (2002) Creating a Conducive Policy Environment for Micro, 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Pakistan. ILO, Geneva. 
 
  22
Javid, A. and R. Iqbal (2007) Relationship Between Corporate Governance Indicators and 
Firm Value: A Case Study of Karachi Stock Exchange. PIDE Working Paper (14). 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad. 
 
Kardar, S. H. (2007) Establishing Property Rights through a Secure System of Land 
Management. PIDE Policy Viewpoint, No 3 (March). Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics. 
 
Kaufmann, D., and A. Kraay (2002) Growth Without Governance. The World Bank. (The 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series  2928.) 
 
Khan, F. S. (2006) Property Rights and Taxonomy of Land Records: A case Study of 
Lahore. Paper presented at the 22nd Annual General Meeting of the Pakistan Society of 
Development Economics (19-22 December, 2006). Lahore. 
 
Khwaja, A. I. ans A. Mian (2005) Unchecked Intermediaries: Price Manipulation in an 
Emerging Stock Market. Journal of Financial Economics 78, 203-241. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1997) Legal Determinants 
of External Finance. Journal of Finance 52,  1131–1150. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1998) Law and Finance. 
Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113–1155. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1999) The Quality of 
Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 15, 222–279. 
 
North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
  23
North, D., and R. P. Thomas (1973) The Rise of The Western World: A New Economic 
History. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Norton, S. W. (1998) Poverty, Property Rights, and Human Well-Being: A Cross-
National Study. Cato Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2: Fall, 233-245. 
 
Posner, R. (1998) Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development. The World 
Bank Research Observer, 13: February, 1-11. 
 
Prokopijevic, M. (2002) Does Growth Further Improve Economic Freedom? Available 
at: http://www.freetheworld.com/papers/Miroslav_Prokopijevic.pdf 
 
Qazi, M. U. (2006) Computerization of Land Records in Pakistan. A Comparative 
Analysis of Two Projects from a Human Security Perspective. Downloaded from: 
http://www.apdip.net/projects/e-government/capblg/casestudies/Pakistan-Qazi.pdf 
 
Rigobon, R. and D. Rodrik (2004) Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: 
Estimating the Interrelationships. NBER Working Paper 10750. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Massachusetts. http://www.nber.org/papers/w10750 
 
Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian, and F. Trebbi (2004) Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of 
Economic Growth 9 (2): June, 131-165. 
 
Ruli, Genc (1999) Rule of Law and Economic Growth - How Strong Is Their Interaction? 
Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/1999/pdf/043-047.pdf 
 
Siddique, O. (undated) Simplification and Promotion of Laws and Procedures for 
Corporatization of Small and Medium Enterprises in Pakistan. A Study Conducted for the 
Ministry of Industries and Production; and the Securities and Exchange Corporation of 
Pakistan. Islamabad. 
  24
 
Smith, A. [1776] (1981) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(Vol 1and 2). Indianapolis, Liberty Classics. 
 
Stocker, M. L. (2005) Equity Returns and Economic Freedom. Cato Journal, Vol. 25, 
No. 3: Fall, 583-594. 
 
Stolper, A. M. Walker, C. Sabatini and J. Marczak (2006) Rule of Law, Economic 
Growth and Prosperity. Report of the Rule of Law Working Group. Americas Society 
and Council of the Americas. New York. 
 
Summers, R. S. (1999) Some Basic Ways Good Law, Good Legal Institutions’ Good 
Legal Traditions’ and Principles of the Rule of Law can Augment Markets. IRIS 
Working Paper No. 227. Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector. 
University of Maryland.  Maryland. 
 
Tures, J.  A. (2003) Economic Freedom and Conflict Reduction: Evidence from the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Cato Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3: Winter, 533-542. 
 
Vega-Gordill, M. and J. L. A. lvarez-Arce (2003) Economic Growth and Freedom: A 
Causality Study. Cato Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2: Fall, 199-215. 
 
Voigt, S. (1998) Making Constitutions Work: Conditions for Maintaining the Rule of 
Law. Cato Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1998, 191-208. 
 
World Bank (2010a) Doing Business. Country Profile for Pakistan. The World Bank and 
IFC. Washington.   www.doingbusiness.org 
 
World Bank (2010b) Doing Business in Pakistan: Comparing Regulation in 13 Cities and 
183 Economies. The World Bank and IFC. Washington.   www.doingbusiness.org 
 
  25
 
World Bank (2005) Corporate Governance Country Assessment – Pakistan: Report on 
the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). Downloaded from: 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_pak.pdf 
 
Watson, P. (2003) The Rule of Law and Economic Prosperity, at: 
http://www.legalnetlink.net/announcements/speech.pdf 
 
 
 
 
